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Abstract. In this paper we consider the dynamics of abstract argumentation in
Baroni and Giacomin’s framework for the evaluation of extension based argu-
mentation semantics. Following Baroni and Giacomin, we do not consider indi-
vidual approaches, but we define general principles or postulates that individual
approaches may satisfy. In particular, we define abstraction principles for the at-
tack relation, and for the arguments in the framework. We illustrate the principles
on the grounded extension. In this paper we consider only principles for the single
extension case, and leave the multiple extension case to further research.
1 Introduction
Argumentation is a suitable framework for modeling interaction among agents. Dung
introduced a framework for abstract argumentation with various kinds of so-called se-
mantics. Baroni and Giacomin introduced a more general framework to study general
principles of sets of semantics [1]. This is a very promising approach, since due to the
increase of different semantics we need abstract principles to study the proposals, com-
pare them, and select them for applications. So far Dung’s argumentation framework
has been mainly considered as static, in the sense that the argumentation framework is
fixed. The dynamics of argumentation framework has attracted a recent interest where
the problem of revising an argumentation framework has been addressed [5, 7]. In this
paper, we address complementary problems and study how the semantics of an argu-
mentation framework remains unchanged when we change the set of arguments or the
attack relations between them. In particular, we consider the case in which arguments or
attack relations are removed, for example when agents retract arguments in a dialogue.
More precisely, we address the following questions:
1. Which principles can be defined for abstracting (i.e., removing) an attack relation?
2. Which principles can be defined for abstracting (i.e., removing) an argument?
3. Which of these principles are satisfied by the grounded semantics?
We use the general framework of Baroni and Giacomin for arbitrary argumentation
semantics, but we consider only semantics that give precisely one extension, like the
grounded extension or the skeptical preferred semantics. Baroni and Giacomin [1] de-
fine the so-called directionality and resolution principles, which may be considered as
argument and attack abstraction principles respectively. However, whereas directional-
ity only considers abstraction from disconnected arguments, we also consider abstrac-
tion from arguments which are connected. To define the principles, we use Caminada’s
distinction between accepted, rejected and undecided arguments [4]. We find some re-
sults for the most popular semantics used in argumentation, namely the grounded ex-
tension.
In this paper we consider only principles for the single extension case, and leave the
multiple extension case to further research. Moreover, we consider only abstractions
which differ only one attack or one argument.
The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give a recall of Dung’s
argumentation framework, the framework of Baroni and Giacomin, Caminada labeling,
and we introduce the notion of abstraction. In Section 3 we consider the abstraction of
attack relations and in Section 4 we consider the abstraction of arguments.
2 Formal framework for abstraction principles
2.1 Dung’s argumentation framework
Argumentation is a reasoning model based on constructing arguments, determining
potential conflicts between arguments and determining acceptable arguments. Dung’s
framework [6] is based on a binary attack relation. In Dung’s framework, an argument
is an abstract entity whose role is determined only by its relation to other arguments.
Its structure and its origin are not known. We restrict ourselves to finite argumentation
frameworks, i.e., those frameworks in which the set of arguments is finite.
Definition 1 (Argumentation framework). An argumentation framework is a tuple
〈B,→〉 where B is a finite set (of arguments) and→ is a binary (attack) relation defined
on B × B.
The output of 〈B,→〉 is derived from the set of selected acceptable arguments, called
extensions, with respect to some acceptability semantics. We need the following defini-
tions before we recall the most widely used acceptability semantics of arguments given
in the literature.
Definition 2. Let 〈B,→〉 be an argumentation framework. Let S ⊆ B.
– S defends a if ∀b ∈ B such that b→ a, ∃c ∈ S such that c→ b.
– S ⊆ B is conflict-free if and only if there are no a, b ∈ S such that a→ b.
The following definition summarizes the well-known acceptability semantics.
Definition 3 (Acceptability semantics). LetAF = 〈B,→〉 be an argumentation frame-
work. Let S ⊆ B.
– S is an admissible extension if and only if it is conflict-free and defends all its
elements.
– S is a complete extension if and only if it is conflict-free and S = {a | S defends a}.
– S is a grounded extension of AF if and only if S is the smallest (for set inclusion)
complete extension of AF .
– S is a preferred extension of AF if and only if S is maximal (for set inclusion)
among admissible extensions of AF .
– S is the skeptical preferred extension of AF if and only if S is the intersection of
all preferred extensions of AF .
– S is a stable extension of AF if and only if S is conflict-free and attacks all argu-
ments of B\S .
Which semantics is most appropriate in which circumstances depends on the appli-
cation domain of the argumentation theory. The grounded extension is the most basic
one, in the sense that its conclusions are not controversial, each argumentation frame-
work has a grounded extension (it may be the empty set), and this extension is unique.
The grounded extension therefore plays an important role in the remainder of this paper.
The preferred semantics is more credulous than the grounded extension. There always
exists at least one preferred extension but it does not have to be unique. Stable exten-
sions have an intuitive appeal, but their drawbacks are that extensions do not have to be
unique and do not have to exist. Stable extensions are used, for example, in answer set
programming, where it makes sense that some programs do not have a solution.
2.2 Baroni and Giacomin’s framework
In this paper we use the recently introduced formal framework for argumentation of
Baroni and Giacomin [1]. They assume that the set B represents the set of arguments
produced by a reasoner at a given instant of time, and they therefore assume that B
is finite, independently of the fact that the underlying mechanism of argument genera-
tion admits the existence of infinite sets of arguments. Like in Dung’s original frame-
work, they consider an argumentation framework as a pair 〈B,→〉 where B is a set and
→⊆ (B×B) is a binary relation on B, called the attack relation. In the following it will
be useful to explicitly refer to the set of all arguments which can be generated, which
we call N for the universe of arguments.
The generalization of Baroni and Giacomin is based on a function E that maps an ar-
gumentation framework 〈B,→〉 to its set of extensions, i.e., to a set of sets of arguments.
However, this function is not formally defined. To be precise, they say: “An extension-
based argumentation semantics is defined by specifying the criteria for deriving, for a
generic argumentation framework, a set of extensions, where each extension represents
a set of arguments considered to be acceptable together. Given a generic argumentation
semantics S, the set of extensions prescribed by S for a given argumentation frame-
work AF is denoted as ES(AF ).” The following definition captures the above informal
meaning of the function E . Since Baroni and Giacomin do not give a name to the func-
tion E , and it maps argumentation frameworks to the set of accepted arguments, we call
E the acceptance function.
Definition 4. Let N be the universe of arguments. A multiple extensions acceptance
function E : N × 2N×N → 22N is
1. a partial function which is defined for each argumentation framework 〈B,→〉 with
finite B ⊆ N and→⊆ B × B, and
2. which maps an argumentation framework 〈B,→〉 to sets of subsets of B:
E(〈B,→〉) ⊆ 2B.
The generality of the framework of Baroni and Giacomin follows from the fact that
they have to define various principles which are built-in in Dung’s framework. For ex-
ample, Baroni and Giacomin identify the following two fundamental principles under-
lying the definition of extension-based semantics in Dung’s framework, the language
independent principle and the conflict free principle (see [1] for a discussion on these
principles). In the following, we assume that these two principles are satisfied.
Definition 5 (Language independence). Two argumentation frameworks
AF1 = 〈B1,→1 〉 andAF2 = 〈B2,→2〉 are isomorphic if and only if there is a bijec-
tive mapping m : B1 → B2, such that (α, β) ∈→1 if and only if (m(α),m(β)) ∈→2.
This is denoted as AF1 .=m AF2.
A semantics S satisfies the language independence principle if and only if
∀AF1 = 〈B1,→1〉, ∀AF2 = 〈B2,→2〉 such that AF1 .=m AF2 we have ES(AF2) =
{M(E) | E ∈ ES(AF1))}, where M(E) = {β ∈ B2 | ∃α ∈ E, β = m(α)}.
Definition 6 (Conflict free). Given an argumentation framework AF = 〈B,→〉, a set
S ⊆ B is conflict free, denoted as cf(S), iff @a, b ∈ S such that a→ b. A semantics S
satisfies the conflict free principle if and only if ∀AF,∀E ∈ ES(AF ), E is conflict free.
2.3 The single extension case
In this paper we consider only the case in which the semantics of an argumentation
framework contains precisely one extension. Examples are the grounded and the skep-
tical preferred extension.
Definition 7. LetN be the universe of arguments. A single extension acceptance func-
tion A : N × 2N×N → 2N is
1. a total function which is defined for each argumentation framework 〈B,→〉 with
finite B ⊆ N and→⊆ B × B, and
2. which maps an argumentation framework 〈B,→〉 to a subset ofB:A(〈B,→〉) ⊆ B.
Principles of Baroni and Giacomin defined for multiple acceptance functions such
as directionality and conflict free are defined also for the single extension case, because
the set of all single extension acceptance functions is a subset of the set of all multiple
extensions acceptance functions. For example, a semantics S satisfies the conflict free
principle when the unique extension is conflict free: ∀AF,AS(AF ) is conflict free.
2.4 Abstraction
We now define abstraction relations between argumentation frameworks.
Definition 8 (Abstraction). Let 〈B,R〉 and 〈B′,S〉 be two argumentation frameworks.
– 〈B,R〉 is an argument abstraction from 〈B′,S〉 iff B ⊆ B′ and ∀a, b ∈ B, aRb if
and only if aSb.
– 〈B,R〉 is an attack abstraction from 〈B′,S〉 iff B = B′ andR ⊆ S.
– 〈B,R〉 is an argument-attack abstraction from 〈B′,S〉 iff B ⊆ B′ andR ⊆ S .
Baroni and Giacomin also introduce two principles which may be interpreted as argu-
ment abstraction or attack abstraction principles, the so-called directionality and resolu-
tion principles. Directionality says that unattacked sets are unaffected by the remaining
part of the argumentation framework as far as extensions are concerned (a principle
which, as they show, does not hold for stable semantics, but it does hold for most other
semantics). This may be seen as an argument abstraction principle, in the sense that
when we abstract away all arguments not affecting a part of the argumentation frame-
work, then the extensions of this part of the framework are not affected either (see their
paper for the details).
2.5 Caminada labeling
In the definition of principles in the following section, it is useful to distinguish between
rejected and undecided arguments. The following definition gives Caminada’s [4] trans-
lation from extensions to three valued labelling functions. Caminada uses this transla-
tion only for complete extensions, such as the grounded extension, such that an argu-
ment is accepted if and only if all its attackers are rejected, and an argument is rejected
if and only if it has at least one attacker that is accepted. We use it also for extensions
which are not complete, such as the skeptical preferred extension, such that Caminada’s
labelling principles may not hold in general. We assume only that extensions are conflict
free, i.e., an accepted argument cannot attack another accepted argument.
Definition 9 (Rejected and undecided arguments). Let A(AF ) be a conflict free
extension of an argumentation framework AF = 〈B,→〉, then B is partitioned into
A(AF ),R(AF ) and U(AF ), where:
– A(AF ) is the set of accepted arguments,
– R(AF ) = {a ∈ B | ∃x ∈ A(AF ) : x→ a} is the set of rejected arguments, and
– U(AF ) = B \ (A(AF ) ∪R(AF )) is the set of undecided arguments.
3 Attack abstraction principles
In this section, we consider the situation where the set of arguments remains the same,
but the attack relation may shrink (abstraction). Our framework considers principles
where we remove a single attack relation a→ b from an argumentation framework. We
distinguish whether arguments a and b are accepted, rejected or undecided.
Principle 1 (Attack abstraction) An acceptance function A satisfies the XY attack
abstraction principle, where X ,Y ∈ {A,R,U}, if for all argumentation frameworks
AF = 〈B,→〉, ∀a ∈ X (AF )∀b ∈ Y(AF ) : A(〈B,→ \{a→ b}〉) = A(AF ).
We start with two useful lemmas. The first says that there cannot be an attack rela-
tion from an accepted argument to another accepted or an undecided argument, denoted
AA and AU respectively.
Lemma 1. Each semantics that satisfies the consistency principle (and thus each se-
mantics defined by Dung) satisfies the following principle.
AA;AU There is no attack from an accepted argument to an accepted or undecided
argument.
Proof. (sketch)AA is a reformulation of the consistency principle.AU follows directly
from the notion of undecided in Definition 9.
The second lemma gives a new characterization of the distinction between grounded
and skeptical preferred semantics. It says that there cannot be an attack relation from
an undecided argument to an accepted argument, denoted UA. In other words, if an ac-
cepted argument is attacked, then its attacker is itself attacked by an accepted argument
and thus rejected.
Lemma 2. The grounded semantics satisfies the following principle, whereas the skep-
tical preferred semantics does not.
UA There is no attack from an undecided argument to an accepted argument.
Proof. (sketch) A counterexample for the skeptical preferred semantics is a well known
example distinguishing the two semantics, that contains four arguments {a, b, c, d}
where a and b attack each other, both a and b attack c, and c attacks d. The grounded
extension is empty, whereas the skeptical preferred extension contains only d. All the
other arguments are undecided, there are no rejected arguments. Thus, in the skeptical
preferred semantics there is an undecided argument that attacks an accepted argument,
whereas in the grounded semantics, there is no such argument. The fact that in the
grounded semantics there are no undecided arguments attacking accepted arguments
follows by structural induction on the construction of the grounded extension.
The following proposition shows that the grounded extension satisfies seven of the
nine abstraction principles.
Proposition 1. The grounded semantics satisfies the AA, AU , UA, UR, RA, RU
and RR attack abstraction principles, and it does not satisfy the AR and UU attack
abstraction principles. Intuitively the satisfied principles reflect the following ideas:
AA;AU ;UA hold vacuously, since there is nothing to remove (Lemma 1 and 2).
RA;RR;RU: the attacks from a rejected argument do not influence the extension.
This principle holds for any attacked argument b.
UR: the attacks on a rejected argument b by an undecided argument a do not influence
the extension. Intuitively, this means that an argument is rejected only when it is
attacked by an accepted argument.
Proof. (sketch) The satisfied principles can be proven by induction. Take the argumen-
tation framework and the abstracted one, and show that in each step of the construction
of the grounded extension, the two remain the same. Counterexamples for UU and AR
attack abstraction are given below.
UU Consider an argumentation framework composed of two arguments a and b attack-
ing each other so both will be undecided. If we remove the attack from a to b, then
b attacks a, so b will be accepted and a is rejected by the grounded extension, and
all other reasonable acceptability semantics.
AR For the latter, consider again an argumentation framework composed of two ar-
guments a and b, where a attacks b. a is accepted while b is rejected. If we remove
this attack relation, then both are accepted.
Proposition 1 leaves two interesting cases for further principles: the removal of an
attack relation from an undecided argument to another undecided argument, i.e., UU ,
and the removal of an attack relation from an argument that is accepted to an argument
that is rejected, i.e., AR. In both cases, the extension can stay the same only under
conditions: the challenge is therefore to define suitable conditions. We first define con-
ditional attack abstraction. The idea is that if we remove an attack from a to b, then in
those two cases there must be another reason why b does not become accepted.
Principle 2 (Conditional attack abstraction) An acceptance function A satisfies the
XY(Z) attack abstraction principle, where X ,Y,Z ∈ {A,R,U}, if for all argumen-
tation frameworks AF = 〈B,→〉,
∀a ∈ X (AF )∀bY(AF ): if ∃c ∈ Z(AF ) such that c 6= a, c→ b then
A(〈B,→ \{a→ b}〉) = A(AF ),
Proposition 2. The grounded semantics satisfies the UU(A) and UU(U) attack ab-
straction principles. It does not satisfy the AR(A), AR(U), AR(R), UU(R) attack
abstraction principles.
UU(A) holds vacuously since this situation never occurs.
UU(U) represents that for attacks among undecided arguments, it is only important
that there is at least one of such attacks, additional attacks to the same undecided
argument do not change the extension.
Proof. (sketch) UU(U) can be proven by induction. Take the argumentation framework
and the abstracted one, and show that in each step of the construction of the grounded
extension, the two remain the same.
AR(A) Consider three arguments {a, b, c} with a attacks b, b attacks c and c attacks
b. The grounded extension is {a, c}, and b is rejected. If we remove the attack from
a to b, then the grounded extension is {a}.
AR(U) Consider five arguments {a, b, c, d, e} with a attacks b, b attacks c, c attacks
b, c attacks d and d attacks c, b attacks e. The grounded extension is {a, e}, b
is rejected, c and d are undecided. If we remove the attack from a to b, then the
grounded extension is {a}, all others are undecided.
AR(R) Follows from Proposition 1. Due toRR abstraction principle, we can remove
the attack among the rejected arguments without changing the extension. Do this for
all attacks among rejected arguments. Then due to the fact that grounded extension
does not satisfy AR, it also does not satisfy AR(R).
UU(R) Follows from Proposition 1. Due to RU abstraction principle, we can remove
the attack from the rejected arguments to the undecided arguments without chang-
ing the extension. Do this for all attacks among rejected arguments. Then due to the
fact that grounded extension does not satisfy UU , it also does not satisfy UU(R).
Note that the skeptical extension does not satisfy UU(U). Consider again the example
given in the proof of Lemma 2. The preferred extensions are {a, d} and {b, d}. So the
skeptical extension is {d}. All other arguments are undecided. Let us now remove the
attack from a to c. Then the preferred extensions are {a, c} and {b, d}. Thus the skep-
tical extension is empty. In other words, the UU(U) abstraction principle characterizes
another distinction between the grounded and skeptical preferred semantics.
Summarizing, for argument b to remain undecided when we remove the attack from
a to b, there must be another reason besides a why b is undecided. The other reason
cannot be an accepted argument attacking b, since in that case b would be rejected.
Consequently the extension may change. And the other reason cannot be a rejected
argument attacking b since an attack from a rejected argument doesn’t necessarily make
an argument undecided. Therefore, we ask that there is another undecided argument c
attacking b. This motivates the UU(U) principle.
Proposition 2 leaves two interesting cases for further development, AR(A) and
AR(U) abstraction. We start with AR(A). Due to the removal of the attack, the status
of argument b may remain rejected or change from rejected to accepted or undecided.
When the argument becomes accepted then it should belong to the extension follow-
ing all reasonable acceptability semantics. Therefore we consider the cases where b
remains rejected or becomes undecided. When b is still rejected, this means that there
is another accepted argument c unequal to a, which attacks b. This motivates AR(A)
principle. However, the counterexample shows that the reason that c is accepted, may
be b itself! The counterexample indicates ways in which conditional abstraction can be
further developed: the rejection of b should not be the reason for the acceptance of c.
One simple way to prevent the possibility that the rejection of b is the cause of the
acceptance of c, is to prevent any paths from b to c. In fact, we can do a little better,
because only odd paths can lead to acceptance. This motivates the following principle.
Principle 3 (Acyclic conditional attack abstraction) An acceptance function A sat-
isfies the acyclic XY(Z) attack abstraction principle, where X ,Y,Z ∈ {A,R,U}, if
for all argumentation frameworks AF = 〈B,→〉,
∀a ∈ X (AF )∀bY(AF ): if ∃c ∈ Z(AF ) such that c 6= a, c→ b, and there is no odd
length sequence of attacks from b to c, then A(〈B,→ \{a→ b}〉) = A(AF ),
Proposition 3. The grounded semantics satisfies the acyclic AR(A) abstraction prin-
ciple.
We now consider AR(U). Thus there is an accepted argument a attacking rejected
argument b, which is also attacked by undecided argument c. In this case, the argument
b may change into undecided. In that case, argument b is still not in the extension,
but there may be implications in other parts of the argumentation framework. As the
counterexample in Proposition 2 shows, b should not be the cause of acceptance of
another argument.
Principle 4 (Stronger conditional attack abstraction) An acceptance functionA sat-
isfies the XY(Z,W) attack abstraction principle, if for all argumentation frameworks
AF = 〈B,→〉,
∀a ∈ X (AF )∀bY(AF ): if ∃c ∈ Z(AF ) such that c 6= a, c→ b and ∀d ∈ W(AF ) ,
we do not have b→ d, then A(〈B,→ \{a→ b}〉) = A(AF ),
where X ,Y,Z,W ∈ {A,R,U}.
Proposition 4. The grounded semantics satisfies the AR(U ,A) abstraction principle.
4 Argument abstraction principles
In this section we consider the abstraction of an argument, including the attack relations
involving this argument. It builds on the abstraction principles for attack relations in the
previous section. As before, we distinguish between removal of an argument which is
accepted, which is rejected and which is undecided. In the first case the extension should
be the extension without the accepted argument, in the other two cases the extension
should stay the same. So we have to consider three cases. Let →a denote the set of
attack relations related to an argument a. Formally, we have the following principles:
Principle 5 (Argument abstraction) An acceptance function A satisfies the
X ∈ {R,U , A} argument abstraction principle if for all argumentation frameworks
AF = 〈B,→〉, if a ∈ X (AF ), then A(〈B \ {a},→ \ →a〉) = A(AF ) \ {a}.
The following proposition shows that only R abstraction is satisfied. For example,
if we remove an accepted argument, then arguments attacked by the removed accepted
argument may become accepted.
Proposition 5. The grounded extension satisfies R argument abstraction, and it does
not satisfy A and U argument abstraction. This represents the following idea.
R Rejected arguments do not play a role in the argumentation and can be removed.
Proof. (sketch) Follows from the abstraction principles of the attack relation or their
counterexamples in Proposition 1. For U abstraction take two arguments a and b attack-
ing each other, and for A abstraction take two arguments a and b where a attacks b.
This leave two interesting cases, U abstraction and A abstraction. We start with U
abstraction. Unlike rejected arguments whose attacks are inoffensive, an attack from an
undecided argment may “block” an argument, i.e., prevents the argument to be accepted.
Therefore the removal of an undecided argument may change the extension. One way
to keep the extension unchanged is that the removed undecided argument only attacks
arguments which are in the extension (so the attacks have not been successful) or out of
the extension but due to other arguments. Formally, we have the following principles:
Principle 6 (U argument abstraction 1) A satisfies the undecided argument abstrac-
tion 1 principle if for all argumentation frameworks AF = 〈B,→〉, if a ∈ U(AF )
is an undecided argument and a attacks only accepted arguments in A(AF ), then
A(〈B \ {a},→ \ →a〉) = A(AF ).
Principle 7 (U argument abstraction 2) A satisfies the undecided argument abstrac-
tion 2 principle if for all argumentation frameworks AF = 〈B,→〉, if a ∈ U(AF ) is an
undecided argument and a attacks only rejected arguments in R(AF ), then
A(〈B \ {a},→ \ →a〉) = A(AF ).
Moreover, inspired by UU(U) attack abstraction principle, we define the following U
argument abstraction principle.
Principle 8 (U argument abstraction 3) A satisfies the undecided argument abstrac-
tion 3 principle if for all argumentation frameworks AF = 〈B,→〉, if a ∈ U(AF ) is an
undecided argument and for each undecided argument b attacked by a, there is another
undecided argument c 6= b that attacks b, then A(〈B \ {a},→ \ →a〉) = A(AF ).
Proposition 6. The grounded extension satisfies U argument abstraction principle 1, 2
and 3.
Proof. (sketch) U argument abstraction 1 principle holds vacuously (Lemma 2). The
others follow from Proposition 1 and 2.
Finally, we consider weakened A abstraction principles. The first principle of ac-
cepted argument abstraction is Baroni and Giacomin’s principle of directionality re-
stricted to single arguments. If we remove an argument that does not attack another
argument besides possibly itself, then the extensions will remain the same.
Principle 9 (A abstraction 1) A satisfies the accepted argument abstraction 1 princi-
ple if for all argumentation frameworks AF = 〈B,→〉, if a ∈ A(AF ) is an accepted
argument, and there is no argument b ∈ B unequal to a such that a attacks b, then
A(〈B \ {a},→ \ →a〉) = A(AF ) \ {a}.
The second principle of accepted argument abstraction is inspired by Proposition 3. It
says that if we remove an argument b ∈ B which attacks only arguments which are also
attacked by other arguments, then the extensions remain the same.
Principle 10 (A abstraction 2) A satisfies the accepted argument abstraction 2 prin-
ciple if for all argumentation frameworks AF = 〈B,→〉, if a ∈ A(AF ) is an accepted
argument, and for each rejected argument b ∈ R(AF ) such that a → b, there is an-
other argument c ∈ A(AF ) such that c→ b, and there is no odd attack sequence from
b to c, then A(〈B \ {a},→ \ →a〉) = A(AF ) \ {a}
Proposition 7. The grounded extension satisfies A abstraction 1 and 2 principles.
5 Related research
Besides the work of Baroni and Giacomin on principles for the evaluation of argumen-
tation semantics, there is various work on dialogue and a few very recent approaches
on the dynamics of argumentation. Researchers in the multi-agent systems area have
been looking at this problem under various names. Cayrol et al. [5] define a typology
of refinement (the dual of abstraction) (called revision in their paper), i.e. adding an
argument. Then they define principles and condition so that each type of refinement
becomes a revision (called classical revision in their paper), i.e., the new argument is
accepted. Refinement and revision is different from abstraction considered in this paper,
and they do not define general principles as we do. Rotstein et al. [7] introduce the no-
tion of dynamics into the concept of abstract argumentation frameworks, by considering
arguments built from evidence and claims. They do not consider abstract arguments and
general principles as we do in this paper. Barringer et al. [2] consider internal dynamics
by extending Dung’s theory in various ways, but without considering general principles.
6 Summary and further research
Motivated by situations where the argumentation framework may change, for exam-
ple by dialogues in which arguments can be retracted or added, we study principles
where the extension does not change when we consider the dynamics of the argumenta-
tion framework. The most interesting attack abstraction principles are listed in Table 1.
This table should be read as follows. Each line represents a principle. For example,
the first line says that A satisfies the RA;UA principle if for all argumentation frame-
works AF = 〈B,→〉, if b ∈ A(AF ) is an accepted argument, then for all arguments
a ∈ R(AF ) ∪ U(AF ), A(〈B,→ \{a → b}〉) = A(AF ). For each principle, we
state whether it is satisfied by the grounded extension or not. Vacuously means that the
situation does not occur for the grounded extension.
Principle Condition Grounded extension
AA, AU , UA a ∈ A(AF ) ∪ U(AF ), b ∈ A(AF ) or yes (vacuously)
a ∈ A(AF ), b ∈ A(AF ) ∪ U(AF )
RA, RR, RU a ∈ R(AF ) yes
UR a ∈ U(AF ), b ∈ R(AF ) yes
UU(A) a ∈ U(AF ), b ∈ U(AF ), ∃c ∈ A(AF ), c→ b yes (vacuously)
UU(U) a ∈ U(AF ), b ∈ U(AF ), ∃c ∈ U(AF ), c 6= a, c→ b yes
AR(U), AR(R),
UU(R) no
AR(A) a ∈ A(AF ), b ∈ R(AF ), ∃c ∈ A(AF ), c 6= a, c→ b yes
no odd length sequence of attacks from b to c
AR(U ,A) a ∈ A(AF ), b ∈ R(AF ), ∃c ∈ U(AF ), c→ b, yes
∀d ∈ A(AF ), we do not have b→ d
Table 1. Attack abstraction: if ∀AF = 〈B,→〉 condition, thenA(〈B,→ \{a→ b}〉) = A(AF )
Moreover, the most interesting argument abstraction principles are listed in Table 2.
Principle Condition Grounded extension
R a ∈ R(AF ) yes
U a ∈ U(AF ) no
U 1 a ∈ U(AF ), if a→ c then c ∈ A(AF ) yes (vacuously)
U 2 a ∈ U(AF ), if a→ c then c ∈ R(AF ) yes
U 3 a ∈ U(AF ), if a→ c and c ∈ U(AF ) then . . . yes
A a ∈ A(AF ) no
A 1 a ∈ A(AF ), @b 6= a, a→ b yes
A 2 a ∈ A(AF ), ∀b ∈ R(AF ), a→ b, ∃c ∈ A(AF ), c→ b yes
Table 2. Argument abstraction: if ∀AF = 〈B,→〉 condition, then A(〈B\{a},→ \ →a〉) =
A(AF )\{a}.
There are several directions of future research. We would like to extend our dynamic
analysis to a wider range of principles. For example, we are interested in refinement of
argumentation frameworks [3], and their relation to argument abstraction. Moreover,
besides considering situations in which the extension stays the same, we are interested
in questions about the change needed to change an argument from being accepted to
rejected, or vice versa. Also, we would like to study principles for the multiple extension
case. Also, we would like to apply our theory to practical problems such as evaluation
of argumentation semantics, or sensitivity analysis of a dispute.
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